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Abstract This paper combines technology adoption with capital accumulation tak-
ing into account technological progress. We model this as a multi-stage optimal con-
trol problem and solve it using the corresponding maximum principle. The model
with linear revenue can be solved analytically, while the model with market power
is solved numerically. We obtain that investment jumps upwards right at the moment
that a new technology is adopted. We find that, if the firm has market power, the firm
cuts down on investment before a new technology is adopted. Furthermore, we find
that larger firms adopt a new technology later.
Keywords Optimal control · Multi-stage maximum principle · Capital
accumulation · Technology adoption
1 Introduction
This paper aims at studying the timing of technology adoption. To do so we employ a
relatively new multi-stage modeling approach [1–4] that is perfectly suitable to take
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into account the disruptive changes caused by innovations. This also enables us to
say something about the length of the time interval that the firm invests in a particular
technology, and how the technology adoption decision interacts with the firm’s capital
accumulation behavior.
Our approach is mostly related to [4, 5] and more recent contributions, like [6, 7].
In these contributions, learning raises productivity of a given technology over time,
and revenue is linear in the capital stock. The latter assumption prevents taking into
account a decreasing returns to scale production function and market power. Espe-
cially the latter feature is crucial in today’s economy, where many industries have an
oligopolistic structure. Therefore, there is a necessity to move to a model where the
revenue function is strictly concave. This is certainly a technical challenge, and we
study such a model in this paper.
We start out studying the simple benchmark case of a firm whose revenue is pro-
portional to its capital stock. This implies that the firm is a price taker in the output
market, and that the production function exhibits constant returns to scale. Further-
more, we assume away discounting and consider a finite planning period. The main
advantage of such a simple setting is that insightful analytical results can be obtained.
Because of technological progress, an adoption of a new technology means that the
firm exchanges a less efficient technology for a more efficient one. For this reason, it
is optimal for the investment rate to jump upwards.
We then move to the clearly innovative case, where the revenue function is con-
cave. This is due to market power, which implies that increasing its output reduces the
output price. We reintroduce discounting and take the planning period to be infinite.
Like in the previous model, also here investment jumps upwards at the moment of the
technology switch. As in [8], here we also find a negative anticipation effect, i.e. the
firm invests less before it adopts a new technology, so that it can invest more in the
new technology later on without reducing the output price too much. This accelerates
replacing the old capital stock by the new one. It is important to realize that such
an anticipation effect is absent in models where revenue is linear in the capital stock
(like, e.g., [4] and [5]). A new finding is that a bigger firm adopts a new technology
at a later point of time. The larger the capital stock, the smaller the marginal rev-
enue, which implies that it is less profitable to switch to a more efficient technology
soon. This reduces the opportunity cost of waiting with adopting the new technology,
so the firm will adopt late. Again, such an effect is absent in linear revenue models
like [4, 5]. The implication is that in the long term a bigger firm will produce more
efficiently, which makes it optimal to grow to a higher long-run equilibrium capital
stock.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, while Sect. 3
analyzes the linear revenue case. Section 4 considers the firm with market power,
while Sect. 5 concludes.
2 The Model
This paper makes use of a relatively new multi-stage modeling approach, see, e.g.,
[4] to analyze optimal decisions of technology adoption, and capital investment. In
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presenting the model, we impose that the firm can adopt a new technology only once.
Later on we allow for multiple adoptions over time.
Denote the adoption time of the new technology by T , which is a decision variable.
Following [4, 5], we introduce K(t) to be the capital stock measured in productivity
units being valid at time 0. Before any switch in technology has occurred, an in-
vestment of one unit leads to an increase of K(t) with one unit. After a technology
adoption at time T , an investment of one unit at time t ≥ T increases K(t) by q(T )
units. Due to (embodied) technological progress, q(t) is increasing in t , i.e.
q(0) = 1, q ′(t) > 0 for t ≥ 0.
The level of q at time t denotes the productivity of the frontier technology in the
economy at this time. To account for technological progress, in [8] productivity of
new machines increases linearly over time, where a reference was made to Moore’s
law. Analogously, we impose
q(t) = 1 + bt, (1)
in which b is a positive constant. Alternatively, in [4] it is assumed that q(t) = eγ t ,
where γ is a positive constant, while in [5] there are just two technologies with dif-
ferent values of q available from the start.
In the absence of any adoption costs and learning effects, once the firm decides
to adopt a new technology, it will always choose the technology with the highest
productivity. Consequently, a technology adoption at time T implies that for t ≥ T
the productivity of new machines of this firm equals q(T ). As a result, the firm’s
capital accumulation equations are
K˙ = I − δK for t < T ,
K˙ = q(T )I − δK for T ≤ t < ∞,
where I (t) is investment and δ is the depreciation rate. A higher level of q im-
plies a decrease in the relative price of capital (Ref. [9] has shown that the relative
price of capital has declined fairly steadily and rapidly in the post-war US and other
economies) and raises the user cost of capital by the so-called obsolescence costs,
cf. [10].
One motivating example for this way of modeling is the LCD industry, where our
vintages correspond to generations of the production facility. With each generation
the size of the mother board increases. If the mother board is larger the firm can
produce in a more efficient way, so that introducing a new generation corresponds
to a process innovation. For instance the fourth generation (68 by 88 cm) was first
operated by LG. Philips LCD in 2000. Sharp planned to introduce the 8th generation
(220 by 240 cm) in 2005. Between 2000 and 2005, several other generations became
available for adoption. However, due to large sunk costs associated with building
a new generation plant, and learning effects, firms typically refrain from adopting
all of them immediately. Instead, for some time they stick to using their existing
technologies in order to fully exploit the advantages of the learning curve.
Another area where there is a strong incentive not to use too many technologies
at the same time is the airline industry. There commercial pilots typically only have
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the permission to fly one or two airplane models. If the airline would always buy the
newest available model of Boeing, Airbus and so on, it would not have sufficient flex-
ibility in assigning pilots to planes. Knowing this characteristic of their consumers,
the big producers of airplanes offer different vintages at the same time. Furthermore,
there is also a well developed secondary market, where older vintages can be bought.
In our model, older technologies are never scrapped. This is mainly done for sim-
plicity since we believe that in a model with scrapping, similar results would occur
but the model would be much more complicated and messy and would not add much
to our understanding. In particular, note that due to exponential decay the old capital
goods essentially die out very quickly in our model, so that the capital stocks in a
model with scrapping would not be that much different than in our model.
The investment cost C(I) consists of acquisition cost (where the unit price is nor-
malized to one) plus adjustment cost, which are assumed to be quadratic, i.e.
C(I) = I + c
2
I 2 (2)
for some constant c > 0. The firm maximizes the discounted cash flow stream
over time. The cash inflow is revenue being a function of capital stock denoted by
R(K), while the cash outflow is just the investment cost C(I).
To summarize, the optimization problem with one technology adoption1 is
max
I,T










K˙ = I − δK for 0 ≤ t < T , (4)
K˙ = q(T )I − δK for T ≤ t < ∞, (5)
K(0) = K0 > 0. (6)


















K˙ = I − δK, K(0) = K0 > 0,
(7)
and a Stage 2 problem determining investment after the technology adoption:
U∗2 (KT ,T ) = max
I










K˙ = q(T )I − δK, K(T ) = KT > 0.
(8)
1It is straightforward to write the model if the number of technology adoptions is more than one.
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3 Linear Revenue Function
We start out analyzing a simple model with the aim to obtain analytical results. In this
specification, revenue is proportional to the capital stock. This implies that the firm is
a price taker in the output market and that the production function exhibits constant
returns to scale. The revenue function is
R(K) = aK, (9)
in which a is a positive constant. To guarantee that it is optimal to invest from the
start, we impose that marginal revenue exceeds the initial user cost of capital, i.e.
a > δ. (10)
Furthermore, we assume away discounting and take the planning period to be finite.
Because of the latter assumption we have to introduce a salvage value. The value of
the firm at the horizon date τ equals aK(τ)
δ
, which stands for the total revenue the firm
can obtain by employing the capital stock K(τ) from the horizon date until infinity.
In this section we consider the case, where the firm can adopt a new technology
only once. For illustration purposes, we analyze the same model, but then with two
technology adoptions; see the Appendix.
3.1 A Model with One Technology Adoption














subject to (4)–(6). The analysis of the model consists of three parts. First, we con-
sider the time interval after the new technology is adopted. Then we analyze the time
interval before the technology adoption and finally the time at which the firm starts
investing in the new technology is studied.
3.1.1 Stage 2: The Situation After the New Technology is Adopted
At the time interval [T , τ ] the standard capital accumulation problem
max
I














K˙ = q(T )I − δK,
K(T ) = KT > 0,
arises and we can apply Pontryagin’s maximum principle; see [11]. The Hamiltonian
is








q(T )I − δK),
J Optim Theory Appl (2012) 154:588–614 593
where λi is the co-state variable in Stage i, i = 1,2. The necessary optimality
conditions are:
1 + cI = λ2q(T ), (11)
λ˙2 = δλ2 − a, (12)
λ2(τ ) = a
δ
. (13)
From (12), (13) and (11) it is clear that both the co-state variable λ2 and the invest-
ment rate I are constant over time, i.e.
λ2(t) = λ¯2 = a
δ
,




Combining this with (5), it automatically follows that
K(t) = (K(T ) − K¯2) e−δ(t−T ) +K¯2,
K¯2 = q(T )q(T )a − δ
cδ2
.
3.1.2 Stage 1: The Situation Before the New Technology is Adopted
At the time interval [0, T ] we have the capital accumulation problem (7) with speci-
fication (9), leading to the Hamiltonian






+ λ1(I − δK),
so that the necessary optimality conditions are:
1 + cI = λ1, (15)
λ˙1 = δλ1 − a. (16)
From [2, 4] we know that the co-state variable is continuous at the technology adop-
tion time T . This gives the transversality condition
λ1(T ) = a
δ
,
and like in Stage 2, we derive from (16) and (15) that co-state and investment rate
are constant and given by
λ1(t) = λ¯1 = a
δ
,
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From (14) and (17) we obtain that investment jumps up with the amount of
I¯2 − I¯1 =
(





We conclude that the adoption of a new technology implies that the firm increases
investment. This is because after time T investment is more efficient, since a given
amount implies a larger increase of the capital stock.
3.1.3 Determination of the Technology Adoption Time
It is straightforward to understand that adopting a new technology at time zero or
at time τ gives the same objective value as not adopting a new technology at all,
which is clearly not optimal. This implies that the adoption time T must be such that
0 < T < τ . The following proposition provides an explicit expression for a unique
value of such a T satisfying the necessary optimality conditions.




abτ − 2(a − δ) +
√
4(a − δ)2 + 2abτ(a − δ) + a2b2τ 2). (19)
The implication is that the firm invests in the less efficient technology during a longer
time interval than it invests in the more efficient one, i.e.
0 < τ − T < τ
2
< T. (20)
Proof See the Appendix. 
The result (20) is surprising, since, after all, an earlier switch would enable the
firm to use a more efficient technology earlier. However, by waiting longer, the firm
can adopt a more productive technology. Apparently, at τ/2, the latter effect domi-
nates the former one.
It is interesting to note that this adoption time depends on all parameters of the
model except for the initial capital stock level, which is due to linearity of the rev-
enue function. We now perform some comparative statics for the adoption time with







4(a − δ) + abτ√
a2b2τ 2 + 2a2bτ + 4a2 − 2abτδ − 8aδ + 4δ2 − 2
)
< 0.
Hence, the more efficiently the firm produces, the earlier it adopts the new technology.
The reason is that the productivity increase of a technology adoption is higher the
higher a is. So when the firm waits with adopting a new technology while a is large,
the opportunity cost of waiting is high.
Next, we address the effect of technological progress b:
∂T
∂b
= (a − δ)
3ab2
(
2 − 4(a − δ) + abτ√
a2b2τ 2 + 2a2bτ + 4a2 − 2abτδ − 8aδ + 4δ2
)
> 0
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So, if technological progress goes faster, it pays to wait longer with adopting a new
technology. A similar result is numerically obtained in [12].






2 − 4(a − δ) + abτ√
a2b2τ 2 + 2a2bτ + 4a2 − 2abτδ − 8aδ + 4δ2
)
> 0.
Hence, the firm adopts the new technology later when the depreciation rate is higher.
The reason is that the net value of the investment is smaller when the depreciation
rate is bigger. To make the adoption of a new technology sufficiently profitable, the
firm has to adopt a better technology. To do so it employs technological progress by
delaying the technology adoption time. In the Appendix, we extend this analysis by
allowing for two technology adoptions and show that a similar result like Proposi-
tion 3.1 still holds.
4 Market Power
In this section we study the effect of market power, which implies that the output
price is decreasing in quantity. The result is that the revenue function is concave. For
our analysis we employ the following specification:
R(K) = aK − m
2
K2.
We also take into account that the firm discounts future revenue and costs. We restrict
ourselves to analyzing the case of one technology adoption.
In this section, we first study the firm’s investment behavior after it has adopted
the new technology. We proceed by analyzing the firm’s investments before it adopts
the new technology. Finally, all the obtained information is employed to determine an
implicit expression for the technology adoption time. We also provide an analytical
proof for a negative anticipation effect in investment, thereby extending [8] where this
effect was only numerically shown. We end this section with a numerical analysis.
4.1 The Situation After Technology Adoption (Stage 2)
The Hamiltonian for the problem after the firm has adopted the new technology, thus
for t ∈ [T ,∞[, is









q(T )I − δK). (21)
The necessary optimality conditions are:
1 + cI = λ2q(T ), (22)
λ˙2 = (r + δ)λ2 − a + mK. (23)
Straightforward calculations lead to the following linear dynamic system:
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K˙ = −δK + q(T )I, (24)
I˙ = q(T )
c





The steady state is given by
K¯2 = q(T )a − (r + δ)












q(T )m + δ(r+δ)c
q(T )
.
Hence, an equilibrium with positive capital stock and investment rate exists, provided
that q(T ) > r+δ
a
. To check the stability of the interior equilibrium we compute the
Jacobian of the canonical system (24), (25):
J =
∣∣∣∣ −δ q(T )q(T )
c
m r + δ
∣∣∣∣ = −δ(r + δ) − q
2(T )
c
m < 0. (27)
This implies that the steady state is (saddle point) stable. We end this part by stating
the following lemma.











in which κ depends on








)2 + (r + 2δ)2, (29)
being the negative eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix, where κ < 0 is the first element











The corresponding expressions for capital stock, investment, and co-state are
K(t) = (K(T ) − K¯2) eξ1(t−T ) +K¯2, (31)
I (t) = K(T ) − K¯2
κ





K(T ) − K¯2
κ
eξ1(t−T ) +cI¯2 + 1
)
. (33)
Proof See the Appendix. 
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4.2 The Situation Before Technology Adoption (Stage 1)
Similarly to the analysis of Stage 2, we find that the dynamic system is given by
K˙ = −δK + I,
I˙ = 1
c





Although the Stage 1 interval is of finite length, we still need to specify the steady
state because it is needed to determine the optimal time path (see (40) presented
below). The steady state is
K¯1 = a − (r + δ)
m + cδ(r + δ) ,
I¯1 = δa − δ(r + δ)
m + cδ(r + δ) , (34)
λ¯1 = m + cδa
m + cδ(r + δ) .
Hence, an equilibrium with positive levels of the capital stock and the investment rate





∣∣∣∣ = −δ(r + δ) − mc < 0. (35)
This implies that the steady state is (saddle point) stable. The eigenvalues of the
Jacobian are






+ (r + 2δ)2, (36)






+ (r + 2δ)2, (37)
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with K¯1 and I¯1 defined in (34), while β and γ will be determined in Proposition 4.2
below. The co-state variable satisfies
λ1(t) = 1 + c
(




We now determine the optimal adoption time T , the investment behavior, and the
capital stock
K(T ) = KT (42)
at time T . The following proposition establishes that investment jumps upwards at
the adoption time. Like in the model with the linear revenue function, this is because
the new technology is more productive.













Proof From (22), (A.18) and continuity of the co-state at time T (see, e.g. [4]) it
follows that
1 + cI(T +) = λ(T )q(T ), 1 + cI(T −) = λ(T ),
from which (43) trivially results. 
The following proposition provides an implicit condition for the adoption time T .2
Proposition 4.2 The optimal switching time T is implicitly determined by
λ(T )
(
q(T ) − 1)(λ(T )(q(T ) + 1) − 2) − 2bcΩ(KT ,T ) = 0, (44)
where λ(T ) equals
λ(T ) = 1 + c(β eχ1T +γ eχ2T +I¯1), (45)
in which
β = −κ2(K¯1 + (
δ
q(T )
κ − 1)K¯2 − κc (q(T ) − 1) − q(T )κI¯1)
κ1(q(T )κ − κ2) eχ2T −κ2(q(T )κ − κ1) eχ1T
+ (K0 − K¯1)(q(T )κ − κ2) e
χ2T
κ1(q(T )κ − κ2) eχ2T −κ2(q(T )κ − κ1) eχ1T , (46)
2Due to the fact that the formulas expressed in Proposition 4.2 are so complicated, unfortunately a general
existence result is not available. However, Sect. 4.4 contains a numerical example where the adoption time
T has a finite value.
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γ = κ1(K¯1 + (
δ
q(T )
κ − 1)K¯2 − κc (q(T ) − 1) − q(T )κI¯1)
κ1(q(T )κ − κ2) eχ2T −κ2(q(T )κ − κ1) eχ1T
+ K¯1(q(T )κ − κ1) e
χ1T










κ(2ξ1 − r) + 2
I¯2












with K¯1 and I¯1 from (34), K¯2 and I¯2 from (26), χ1 from (36), χ2 from (37), κ1
from (38), κ2 from (39), ξ1 from (29), and κ from (30).
Proof See the Appendix. 
The level of the capital stock at the switching time can now be derived from (40),
where β and γ satisfy the expressions presented in Proposition 4.2.
The following proposition compares the optimal trajectory with the one corre-
sponding to the model without technology switch, i.e. where
K˙ = I − δK for t ∈ (0,∞).
The proposition shows that before a new technology is adopted, the firm reduces
investment in the current technology.
Proposition 4.3 Adoption of a new technology at time T results in a negative antici-
pation effect in the sense that less investments in the current technology occur before
time T compared to the saddle point path corresponding to the problem without tech-
nology switch.
Proof See the Appendix. 
This result tells us that in fixing its investment the firm anticipates a future tech-
nology switch. Given the future rise in productivity, it becomes attractive to wait for
the new technology. Cutting down on current investments reduces the capital stock,
which in turn raises marginal revenue. This gives the firm the incentive to invest more
in the new technology right after the technology switch. In this way, the firm accel-
erates substituting the new for the old technology. The analytical proof of the antic-
ipation effect provided by Proposition 4.3 adds to [8], where this effect was derived
within a vintage capital framework. We elaborate on this result in the next section.
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Fig. 1 The optimal solution in the phase plane for different initial capital stocks: (a) K0 = 1,
(b) K0 = 630, and (c) K0 = 2500. Panel (d) illustrates the dependence of the adoption time T , the capital
stock at adoption time KT , and the long-run optimal capital K¯2 on the initial capital K0. The other pa-
rameters are: a = 1, m = 0.00008, b = 13 log 2, c = 0.01, r = 0.1, and δ = 0.2. In addition, a movie that
shows the solutions corresponding to a continuously varying initial capital stock is provided on the web
page http://prolog.univie.ac.at/research/technology/movie1.avi
4.4 Example
Here we provide a numerical analysis departing from the parameter values
a = 1, m = 0.00008, b = 1
3
log 2, c = 0.01, r = 0.1, δ = 0.2.
The value for b is based on Moore’s law (the efficiency of a technology doubles
every n years, where we put n = 3), while production is a logarithmic function of the
technological efficiency in the sense that production increases with one unit in case
technology power becomes ten times as large.3
The first three panels of Fig. 1 depict the optimal trajectories in the (K, I)-plane
for increasing values of K0. All solutions have in common the upward jump in in-
vestment at the adoption time as derived in Proposition 4.1.
3In the Dutch magazine Elsevier (January 24, 1998), the Philips manager Theo Claassen argued that utility
(production) increases with the technology-efficiency parameter in a logarithmic way with base 10.
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The first three panels also depict the optimal trajectory in case there is no pos-
sibility of a technology switch (gray curve). Then the firm converges to the steady
state E¯1. We conclude that, compared to the “non-technology switch solution,” es-
pecially right before the adoption time, the firm cuts down on investment. This is a
negative anticipation effect (see also [8]), which can be explained as follows. Less
investment results in a downward effect on the capital stock, which, due to diminish-
ing returns induced by the concavity of the revenue function, in turn raises marginal
revenue. This makes that after the adoption of the new technology, investment be-
comes more profitable. Therefore, right after the adoption time investment jumps to
a higher level, so that the new technology is optimally exploited. In other words, cut-
ting down on current investment makes room for more future investments once the
more efficient technology is adopted, and this accelerates replacing old technology
capital stock by new technology capital stock. In the linear model of Sect. 3, marginal
revenue was not affected by the capital stock level. For this reason the negative an-
ticipation effect did not occur there. In Stage 2 capital stock gradually increases such
that the trajectory asymptotically converges to the steady state E¯2.
What we also see in the first three panels of Fig. 1 is that the capital stock at the
adoption time is increasing in the initial value of the capital stock, which is confirmed
in panel (d). From panel (d) we can also conclude that the adoption time itself is in-
creasing in K0 too. This implies that a larger firm adopts the new technology at a later
point of time, which means that this new technology is more efficient due to techno-
logical progress. The smaller firm switches earlier because a small firm has a high
marginal revenue, which implies that it is more profitable to adopt a more efficient
technology soon. This raises the opportunity cost of waiting with adopting the new
technology, and this implies that the small firm will adopt sooner. The implication is
that the long-run optimal capital stock (steady state of Stage 2, K¯2) is also increasing
in the initial value of the capital stock K0. This indeed results from the fact that the
higher the initial capital stock the later the firm adopts a new technology, implying
that then the new technology is more efficient. This higher efficiency leads to a higher
value of K¯2.
5 Conclusions
This paper studies optimal firm growth in an innovative environment. The frontier
technology in the economy improves over time due to technological progress. A firm
can get access to improved capital goods by technology adoption. After such a tech-
nology adoption the relative price of capital decreases, implying that investment as
well as the long-run capital goods level jumps up.
The paper starts out studying a simple dynamic model of the firm in which revenue
is linear, discounting is absent and the horizon date is finite. This enables us to get
analytical expressions for the optimal timing of technology adoption.
Then the paper proceeds with studying a dynamic model of the firm with an in-
finite time horizon, where cash flows are discounted, and the revenue function is
concave. However, the firm is allowed to adopt a new technology only once. Here
we could analytically prove that technology adoption induces a negative anticipation
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effect, i.e. before the firm adopts a new technology it cuts down on investments in the
capital goods associated with the “old” technology. Since revenues are concave, these
reduced investments result in higher marginal revenue just after the new technology
is adopted, implying that it is optimal to raise investments in the “new” capital goods.
Furthermore, numerically we showed that a large firm switches later. This has the
drawback that it uses a less efficient technology for a longer time, but the advantage
is that the later switch implies that the adopted new technology is more productive.
This in turn implies that it will be optimal to converge to a larger long-run capital
stock level. Hence, a firm that is large initially, will also be large in the long run.
As a topic of future research we have the following in mind. As it is now, in our
framework the firm can costlessly adopt a new technology. However, as argued by
e.g. [13], in reality firms often face major problems in integrating new technologies,
which leads to switch-over disruptions. Incorporating this would enable us to endoge-
nize the number of technology adoptions. In this way we could extend [13] by adding
capital accumulation to the technology adoption analysis.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
Appendix A
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Based on [2, 4] we know that at the technology adoption time T we have the following
condition:




= H2(T ) − abq(T )a − δ
cδ2
(τ − T ). (A.1)
Inserting the expressions for H1(T ) and H2(T ) gives
ab
(1 + bT )a − δ
cδ2
(τ − T )
= a
cδ

















(1 + bT )(1 + bT )a − δ
cδ




from which we obtain after some rearranging:
p(T ) = 3abT 2 + (4(a − δ) − 2abτ)T − 2τ(a − δ) = 0.
Because of (10) this second-order polynomial in T has the unique positive root (19).
The result (20) directly follows from the three inequalities
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p(0) = −2τ(a − δ) < 0,
p(τ/2) = 3
4
abτ 2 + 2(a − δ)τ − abτ 2 − 2τ(a − δ) = −1
4
abτ 2 < 0,
p(τ) = 3abτ 2 + 4(a − δ)τ − 2abτ 2 − 2τ(a − δ) = abτ 2 + 2(a − δ)τ > 0,
and the fact that the quadratic polynomial p(T ) is strictly convex.
A.2 Model with Linear Revenue and Two Technology Adoptions
Now we extend for the linear model the number of technology adoption possibilities















K˙ = I − δK for 0 ≤ t < T1,
K˙ = q(T1)I − δK for T1 ≤ t < T2,
K˙ = q(T2)I − δK for T2 ≤ t < τ,
K(0) = K0 > 0.
Similarly to the analysis of the case with one technology adoption, it is easily obtained
that
λ(t) = λ¯ = a
δ
for 0 ≤ t < τ,
I (t) = I¯1 = a − δ
cδ
for 0 ≤ t < T1,
I (t) = I¯2 = q(T1)a − δ
cδ
for T1 < t < T2,
I (t) = I¯3 = q(T2)a − δ
cδ
for T2 < t < τ,
(A.2)
where, as before, λ is the co-state variable. So again, investment is constant as long
as the firm invests in the same technology, while it jumps upwards after every new
technology adoption.
The following proposition determines the second adoption time T2 as a function
of the first adoption time T1.
Proposition A.1 Given the first adoption time T1, the firm optimally adopts a new
technology for the second time at time T2 that is implicitly determined by
3abT 22 +
(
4(a − δ) − 2abτ)T2 − (2(a − δ) + abT1)T1 − 2(a − δ)τ = 0, (A.3)
or, in explicit form:
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T2 = 13ab
(




4(a − δ)2 + 2ab(a − δ)τ + a2b2τ 2 + 3ab(2(a − δ) + abT1)T1.
(A.4)
Proof Based on [2–4] we know that at the technology adoption time T2 we have the
following condition:




= H3(T2) − abq(T2)a − δ
cδ2
(τ − T2), (A.5)
where H2 and H3 are the Hamiltonians at the intervals [T1, T2] and [T2, τ ]. Their
values just before and just after the second adoption time T2 are
H2(T2) = aKT2 − I¯2 −
c
2





H3(T2) = aKT2 − I¯3 −
c
2






H3(T2) − H2(T2) = ab
cδ
(T1 − T2) − ab2cδ2 (T1 − T2)
[
2a + ab(T1 + T2)
]
.
Plugging this into (A.5) gives
ab
cδ
(T1 − T2)− ab2cδ2 (T1 − T2)
[
2a + ab(T1 + T2)
] = abq(T2)a − δ
cδ2
(τ − T2), (A.6)
which ultimately leads to
3abT 22 +
(
4(a − δ) − 2abτ)T2 − (2(a − δ) + abT1)T1 − 2τ(a − δ) = 0.
Because of (10) this gives the unique positive root (A.4). 
This adoption time depends on all parameters of the model and on the previous
adoption time T1 except for the initial capital stock of this stage. We see that T2 goes
up with T1. A larger T1 implies that the firm has adopted a more efficient technology
at T1 so that it is not so much in a hurry to adopt a new technology for a second time.
An analogous result is numerically obtained in [12].
Concerning the first time that the firm adopts a new technology, we can establish
the following proposition.
Proposition A.2 Given the second adoption time T2, the firm adopts a technology
optimally for the first time at T1, which is implicitly determined by
3abT 21 +
(
4(a − δ) − 2abT2
)
T1 − 2(a − δ)T2 = 0, (A.7)
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or explicitly we can write
T1 = 13ab
(
abT2 − 2(a − δ) +
√
4(a − δ)2 + 2ab(a − δ)T2 + a2b2T 22
)
. (A.8)
Proof At T1 it holds that




= H2(T1) − abq(T1)a − δ
cδ2
(T2 − T1), (A.9)
where H1 and H2 are the Hamiltonians in the intervals [0, T1] and [T1, T2]. Their
values just before and just after the first adoption time T1 are
H1(T1) = aKT1 − I¯1 −
c
2
I¯ 21 + λ1(T1)(I¯1 − δKT1),
H2(T1) = aKT1 − I¯2 −
c
2






H2(T1) − H1(T1) = ab2cδ2
(
abT 21 + 2T1(a − δ)
)
.




abT 21 + 2T1(a − δ)
) = ab (1 + bT1)a − δ
cδ2
(T2 − T1), (A.10)
which ultimately leads to
3abT 21 +
(
4(a − δ) − 2abT2
)
T1 − 2(a − δ)T2 = 0.
Because of (10) this quadratic polynomial has the unique positive root (A.8). 
It can be seen from (A.4) and (A.8) that the adoption times T1 and T2 depend on




1 + 4(a − δ)T1
2abT1 + 2(a − δ) . (A.11)
Substitution of (A.11) into (A.3) eventually gives
P(T1) = 23a3b3T 41 +
(
80a2b2(a − δ) − 12a3b3τ)T 31
+ (84ab(a − δ)2 − 36a2b2(a − δ)τ)T 21
+ (24(a − δ)3 − 32ab(a − δ)2τ)T1 − 8(a − δ)3τ
= 0. (A.12)
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In principle the relevant root of this fourth-order polynomial can be found analytically
but the expression would fill too much space. Nevertheless, some general results can
be obtained that are presented in the following proposition.
Proposition A.3 The optimal adoption times T1 and T2 are unique. Furthermore,
the time interval at which the first technology is used is the largest, followed by the
second technology and then by the third technology, since it holds that









Proof First, existence of an interior adoption time can be established. We start out by
showing that the polynomial (A.12) has at least one root in the relevant interval, so
that T1 ∈]0, τ [. This is because at T1 = 0, the polynomial has a negative value:
P(0) = −8(a − δ)3τ < 0, (A.15)
and, on the other hand, for T1 = τ we have
P(τ) = 11a3b3τ 4 +44a2b2τ 3(a − δ)+52abτ 2(a − δ)2 +16τ(a − δ)3 > 0. (A.16)
Since P(T1) is continuous, indeed the polynomial (A.12) has at least one root in the
relevant interval.
From (A.11), it follows that
T2 = 2T1 − abT
2
1
2abT1 + 2(a − δ) ,
which implies that
T2 − T1 < T1.
This establishes the second part of (A.13).
Now we consider the length of the time interval that the firm produces with its most
efficient technology, i.e. the technology it adopts at T2. From (A.3) it is obtained that
3abT 22 + 4(a − δ)T2 −
(








τ − T2 = ab(T2 + T1) + 2(a − δ)2abT2 + 2(a − δ) (T2 − T1) < T2 − T1,
which establishes the first part of (A.13).
What remains to be shown is the uniqueness of the adoption times T1 and T2.
Since uniqueness of T2 follows from eventual uniqueness of T1 via (A.11), it suf-
fices to show uniqueness of T1. We already know that P(τ) > 0 from (A.16). Since
J Optim Theory Appl (2012) 154:588–614 607
from (A.14) it follows that T1 > τ3 , it is now sufficient to show that P(
τ
3 ) < 0 and












84(a − δ) + 13abτ) + 108(a − δ)2) < 0.
Then, we compute
P ′′(T1) = 276a3b3T 21 − 6
(
12a3b3τ − 80a2b2(a − δ))T1
+ 168ab(a − δ)2 − 72a2b2τ(a − δ).




(−20(a − δ) + 3abτ + √3
√




(−20(a − δ) + 3abτ − √3
√
26(a − δ)2 + 3abτ(2(a − δ) + abτ)).






(−20(a − δ) + 3abτ + √3
√
26(a − δ)2 + 3abτ(2(a − δ) + abτ)).
the desired result, i.e. P ′′(T1) > 0 for T1 > τ3 , directly follows from (A.14)). 
Again we see that like in the case where the firm can adopt a new technology only
once, the optimal adoption times are such that the more productive the technology,
the shorter the time interval the firm invests in the corresponding capacity.4
Next, we analyze the effect of the different parameters on the lengths of the time
intervals at which the different technologies are used. From (A.11) it follows that the
difference in length between the two intervals of use of the first and second technol-
ogy is
L = T1 − (T2 − T1) = abT
2
1












1 (a − δ)






2(a − δ + abT1)2 > 0.
4Within an infinite horizon framework, Refs. [14, 15] find that the optimal lifetime of a technology would
be constant through time (see also [16, 17]). However, in our model the planning period is finite and
investment costs are non-linear (cf. the last footnote of Sect. 3 in [4]).
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This gives the following result.
Proposition A.4 More difference in the lengths of the time intervals at which the firm
produces with the first technology and the second technology arises when b and δ are
larger, and a is smaller.
The ratio of the durations of the last two production intervals is given by
Le = τ − T2
T2 − T1 =
ab(T2 + T1) + 2(a − δ)




= δb(T2 − T1)
2(abT2 + a − δ)2 > 0,
∂Le
∂b
= a(T1 + T2)(a − δ + abT2) − (ab(T2 + T1) + 2(a − δ))aT2
2(abT2 + a − δ)2 < 0,
∂Le
∂δ
= −2(abT2 + a − δ) + (ab(T2 + T1) + 2(a − δ))
2(abT2 + a − δ)2 < 0,
which leads to the following proposition.
Proposition A.5 The relative difference in the lengths of the time intervals, where
production takes place with the second and the third technology, goes up with b and δ,
while it goes down with a.
Combining this with the proposition where the first and the second production
interval were compared leads to the conclusion that intervals become more of equal
length when b and δ are smaller, while a is larger.
It is reasonable that the adoption times will be delayed when the planning period
becomes longer. The next proposition shows that this is indeed true.
Proposition A.6 The firm adopts the second and third technology later when τ in-
creases.
Proof From (A.7) and (A.3) we obtain the total differentials:
(




(a − δ) + abT1
)
dT1
− 2(abT2 + (a − δ))dτ = 0,(




abT1 + (a − δ)
)
dT2 = 0.
The latter equation shows that T1 and T2 move in the same direction. This equation
also gives dT2, which can be plugged into the first one. After some manipulations we







T1 + T2 − τ2
)
(a − δ) − ab(T 21 + 3T 22 + 3τT1 − τT2 − 9T1T2)
)




abT2 + (a − δ)
)(
abT1 + (a − δ)
)
dτ = 0.
The term in front of dτ is clearly negative. To prove the first part of the proposition,
we have to show that the term in front of dT1 is positive. For this it is sufficient that
4
(
T1 + T2 − τ2
)
(a − δ) − ab(T 21 + 3T 22 + 3τT1 − τT2 − 9T1T2) > 0.
This is implied by (15). 
A.3 Proof of Lemma 4.1
We compute the saddle-point path solution. The eigenvalues of the Jacobian are given
by








)2 + (r + 2δ)2,




























From the given initial value K(T ) we can compute α. Equation K(T ) = ακ + K¯2
gives K(T )−K¯2
κ
= α, i.e. we obtain (31) and (32). Then (33) can be derived by com-
bining (32) and (22).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4.2
The Hamiltonian for the problem before the firm has adopted the new technology,
thus when t ∈ [0, T ], is







+ λ1(I − δK), (A.17)
and the necessary optimality conditions are:
1 + cI = λ1,
λ˙1 = (r + δ)λ1 − a + mK.
(A.18)
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Based on [2, 3] a general formula connecting the two stages was developed by [4].
For our model this condition becomes
H1(T ) = H2(T ) − q ′(T )
∫ ∞
T
e−r(t−T ) λ2(t)I (t) dt. (A.19)





















= cλ(T )(q(T )I(T +) − I(T −)) − bcΩ(KT ,T )
with Ω from (48).
Exploiting (A.18) and (22) for I (T −) and I (T +), respectively, eventually gives
(44). Equality (45) directly follows from (41).
Using (33) and (32) the integral in (A.19) can be analytically computed yielding
the closed-form solution (48).
In order to determine β and γ , we need two conditions. The first one is immedi-
ately obtained from the initial condition
K0 = K(0) = βκ1 + γ κ2 + K¯1. (A.20)
The second one comes from the terminal condition for I (T −) by combining (40)
for I (T −), (28) for I (T +), and the jump condition (43). This ultimately leads to
(46) and (47).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4.3
The outline of the proof is as follows. Considering that the switching time is T and
the switching state is KT we show that the value of the objective function at the first
stage can be improved if the initial state of the canonical system lies at or above
the corresponding stable manifold of the equilibrium E1 = (K¯1, I¯1). Therefore, we














K(t) = βκ1 eχ1t +γ κ2 eχ2t +K¯1,
I (t) = β eχ1t +γ eχ2t +I¯1.
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aκ2 − 1 − K¯1(mκ2 + cδ)








We abbreviate this equation by collecting terms of the coefficients of β,γ , their












= βΛ1 − β
2
2
Λ4 + γΛ2 − γ
2
2
Λ5 − βγΛ6 + Λ3. (A.21)
Next, we prove that the coefficients of β and γ are negative. Let us start with
Ω1(a) := aκ1 − 1 − K¯1(mκ1 + cδ). First, we observe that
Ω1(r + δ) = (r + δ)κ1 − 1 < 0,
where we used that κ1 < 0. Next, we note that
Ω ′1(a) = κ1 −
mκ1 + cδ
m + cδ(r + δ)
< κ1 − mκ1
m
− cδ
m + cδ(r + δ)
= − cδ
m + cδ(r + δ) < 0.
Hence, Ω1(a) is strictly decreasing and therefore negative for all a ≥ r + δ. Since
χ1 < 0, this results in
e(χ1−r)T −1
χ1 − r > 0.
We can now conclude that indeed the coefficient of β is negative.
Now we consider the coefficient of γ . First, we prove that Ω2(a) := aκ2 − 1 −
K¯1(mκ2 + cδ) < 0 for all a ≥ r + δ. To prove this proposition we consider the special
case a = r + δ. From the definition of κ2 we derive the following inequality:
(r + δ)κ2 = − (r + δ)c
m
(r + δ − χ2)
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= (r + δ)
r




+ ( r2 + δ)2
< 1.
This results in
Ω2(r + δ) = (r + δ)κ2 − 1 < 0.
Next, we derive
Ω ′2(a) = κ2 −
mκ2 + cδ
m + cδ(r + δ)
= κ2cδ(r + δ) − cδ
m + cδ(r + δ)
= cδ(κ2(r + δ) − 1)
m + cδ(r + δ) < 0.
From the above, we conclude that Ω2(a) < 0 for all a ≥ r + δ. After observing that
e(χ2−r)T −1
χ2 − r > 0,
we indeed find that also the coefficient of γ is negative.
The coefficient of γβ is zero, which immediately follows from the definitions of
κ1 and κ2.
To analyze the coefficients of the squares β2 and γ 2, we consider the factors
e(χi−r)T −1
χi − r > 0, i = 1,2
and note that mκ2i + c > 0, i = 1,2. Hence, the coefficients are positive.
Next, we prove that the objective value for a trajectory (K˜(·), I˜ (·)), satisfying the
canonical system on the interval [0, T ] with K(T ) = KT and starting above the stable
path, has a lower objective value than the stable path itself. Let (β˜, γ˜ ) with γ˜ > 0
correspond to the path (K˜(·), I˜ (·)) and (βs,0) denote the corresponding values for
the path at the stable manifold. Note that γs = 0 by definition of the stable path. Then
we show that
C(β˜, γ˜ ) − C(βs,0) < 0.
To do so, we use the boundary conditions at T satisfying
K˜(T ) = KT = β˜κ1 eχ1T +γ˜ κ2 eχ2T +K¯1,
Ks(T ) = KT = βsκ1 eχ1T +K¯1,
yielding
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since γ˜ > 0. Using the representation (A.21) we find
C(β˜, γ˜ ) − C(βs,0) = (β˜ − βs)Λ1 − (β˜ − βs)
2
2




which proves that the saddle path solution is superior to the solution (K˜(·), I˜ (·)).
Finally, we show that the optimal solution lies beneath the saddle path solution. To
do so, we prove that in a neighborhood of the saddle path the value of the objective is
further increasing for a negative γ . To see this, let us consider a solution (Kh(·), Ih(·))
with corresponding values (βh, γh) and γh = −h < 0, where h, > 0. Similarly to
the previous case we then find
βs − βh = γh κ1
κ2
e(χ2−χ1)T ,





























We conclude that the optimal solution in Stage 1 starts beneath the stable manifold
of E1, where the corresponding path exhibits the negative anticipation effect.
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